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We are definitely in an age of scarcity. Scarcity of resources, 
scarcity of places to dispose of our wastes, and, above a l l , 
scarcity of adequate institutions to face the challenges of the 
current environmental c r i s i s . Ecopolitics represents thus the 
most immediate recognition that, in order to understand the basic 
dimensions of this c r i s i s one must make an attempt to grasp 
concrete social processes. One must look at a particular national 
and histor i c a l situation and attempt to unveil the patterns of 
relationships amongst human beings, individually, in social 
groups and classes, as well as through their institutions. 
An ecopolitical approach to study specific situations, such 
as the ecological disorder in the Amazon, amounts to a study of 
p o l i t i c s . It represents also an analysis of the bureaucratic 
p o l i t i c s of environmental policy formation in Brazil. This means 
to say that only through historical analysis can one pursue an 
evaluation of whether Brazil's present environmental (pollution) 
and ecological (depletion of the resource base) problems have 
emerged from sheer economic growth and industrialization, or 
whether they have been produced by the inadequacies of an 
institutional (bureaucratic) and p o l i t i c a l (social stratification 
and distribution of power) nature, or both. In short, this is a 
study about the bureaucratic dimensions of ecopolitics in Brazil, 
but i t i s not an analysis of specific policies concerning the 
Amazon. The intention is not to explain, for example, the 
socioeconomic and ecological impacts of the occupation of the 
Amazon, but, rather, to unveil the kinds of ecological challenges 
brought up by the p o l i t i c a l development of Brazil. 
The paper opens with a summary review of what would 
constitute an ecopolitical approach to analyze ecological 
disorder. It proceeds then to propose that ecological disorder in 
Brazil should be viewed through three complementary dimensions: 
the characteristics of the process of formation of Brazilian 
society and p o l i t i c a l system; the key tenets of the government 
stand on environmental issues, as revealed in i t s participation 
in the 1972 U.N. Conference on the Human Environment.; and the 
bureaucratic p o l i t i c s involved in environmental policy formation 
and implementeition. The final section of this paper introduces a 
prospective view of ecopolitics in Brazil, integrating these 
three dimensions, and suggesting also some ways of improving our 
understanding of ecological disorder. 
For love of an i n s i g n i f i c a n t p r o f i t the p o p u l a t i o n destroys 
one of the greatest resources that c o u l d assure i t s 
subsistence and the good fortune o f coming generations. 
João M. da S i l v a Coutinho, M i l i t a r y Engineer and 
Ex p l o r e r , w r i t i n g on the Amazon (1868). 
Everything i n d i c a t e s that future generations w i l l have the 
r i g h t to c r i t i c i z e us se v e r e l y i f we s a c r i f i c e per c a p i t a 
income growth f o r other p r i o r i t i e s . 
Mario H. Simonsen, Finance (1974-79) and Planning (1979) 
M i n i s t e r , w r i t i n g on development (1972). 
Why not? We have a l o t l e f t to p o l l u t e . They don't. 
J.P. dos Reis V e l l o s o , Planning M i n i s t e r (1969-79), 
e x p l a i n i n g Japanese investments i n B r a z i l (1972). 
I. INTRODUCTION 1/ 
Celso Furtado once stated that the dynamism of the Brazilian 
economy could not be explained without reference to the sacrifice 
that has been imposed upon the majority of the population and to 
the intensified use of i t s natural resources. 2/ Exploitation of 
the Amazon constitutes a paradigmatic example of that fact. Its 
penetration dates back to colonial times, intensifying in the 
f i r s t decades of this century. It turned, however, into a large-
scale enterprise during the military regime of the years 1964-
1985, thanks in part to the construction of the Transamazon 
Highway but, more important, also to f i s c a l incentives. These had 
the undisguised goal of favouring the big conglomerates of the 
South, especially those representing multinational interests. 
Some of the largest explorations established through this scheme 
of " f i s c a l incentives" belong to Volkswagen, Nestlé, Mitsubishi, 
and others. 3/ This has meant, in ecological terms, the 
specialization or otherwise simplification of natural ecosystems 
which, in the long run, led to destruction and d e s e r t i f i c a t i o n — 
in addition, of course, to the disruption of native populations. 
International interests have a large history in the Amazon. 
In the nineteenth century, several scientists began exploring and 
mapping out the riches of Brazilian flora and fauna. German 
botanist Friedrich P h i l l l i p Von Martius travelled throughout the 
country, including the Amazon, between 1817 and 1820> producing 
one of the f i r s t and best accounts of Brazilian species, the 
fifteen volume Florae Brasillensis (1840). French botanist 
Auguste Saint-Hilaire, in his Viaaem à Provincia de São Paulo e 
Resumo das viagens ao Brasil. Provincia Cisplatina e Missões do 
Paraguay (1833), documents the extensive devastation of natural 
forests, writing perhaps the f i r s t manifesto against what we 
today c a l l Brazil's "savage capitalism." The economic interest of 
foreigners for the Amazon followed suit, particularly during the 
extractive cycles that characterized the economy of Brazil until 
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the end of the nineteenth century and the f i r s t decades of the 
twentieth. Si<?nificant in this respect was the costly 1927 
adventure of Henry Ford, in his i l l - f a t e d attempt to revive 
rubber production. Its subsequent collapse underscored something 
that North American tycoon Daniel Ludwig painfully experienced 
f i f t y years later in his J a r i Project: an absolute ignorance with 
respect to the ecology of the region. 4/ In this case, ignorance 
cost another 2 million ha. of forest to the Amazon. International 
interests have been in the forefront of destruction as well. 
Making use of f i s c a l incentives Volkswagen, for example, was 
responsible for the largest devastation of the Amazon in one 
single property, burning down 140,000 ha. of forest (half of the 
state of Rhode Island, or as much as the city of São Paulo). This 
was done to feed only 46,000 livestock, or one cow to every 7 
acres. 5/ Brazilians have also contributed to much destruction of 
the Amazon. Only the lake of the Tucurui hydroelectric plant, in 
which i t was used the same type of defoliant deployed in Vietnam, 
destroyed an area of 240,000 ha. 
However, i t i s indeed ironic to see the international outcry 
against the lack of constructive policies of the Brazilian 
government towards the Amazon, when in fact the interests of the 
same governments that now cry for conseirvation have been behind 
most of the ecological havoc provoked in the region. Japan, for 
example, i s often heralded for i t s environmental policies. But 
few note, as Redclift does, §J that for a long time i t has been 
possible for the Japanese to lock away their own hardwood forests 
because there were abundant supplies of hardwood in nearby 
Southeast Asia. Now that these forests approach exhaustion, 
Japan is avidly turning to the available reserves of Central 
America, West Africa and the Amazon. 7/ 
There is no doubt that the occupation of the Amazon has 
intensified over the past two decades. Population growth in the 
Amazon has been an astonishing 6 percent during the past ten 
years. Rondônia alone, which had 100,000 inhabitants twenty years 
ago, now counts over 1 million people in i t s borders. This has 
brought with i t the destruction of large tracts of forest, and 
Rondônia i t s e l f lost one-sixth of i t s natural cover during this 
period. If by 1975 some estimates indicated that 3.1 million 
hectares, the equivalent to the area of Massachusetts, had been 
already deforested, in 1987 alone another 7.7 million ha., or the 
area of Maine, went up in flames. This trend indicates that the 
deforested area increased to 12.5 million ha. in 1980, and jumped 
over 4.5 times as much by 1988 (or 12 percent of the forest, 
equivalent to the total area of California and a l l of New England 
combined) . As a matter of fact, over four-fifths of total 
deforestation in the area has occurred since 1980. 8/ 
It i s also impressive to compare the area of the Legal 
Amazon, close to 500 million ha., and the total area of the 
Brazilian territory set aside for preservation. The Amazon would 
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represent roughly 60 percent of Brazil, whereas only 1.5 percent 
of the Brazilian territory has been legally protected in national 
and state parks, reserves and ecological stations. Japan, for 
example, with roughly the same population as Brazil and with less 
than one-twentieth of the Brazilian territory, has 13.5 percent 
of i t s surface permanently protected. The United States, slightly 
larger than Brazil in territory, but with a population almost 
twice as large, has 17 percent. And in Sweden, about the size of 
Japan, but much less densely populated, the total protected area 
reaches 60 percent. 9/ In short, i f the proportion of Brazil's 
territory currently protected i s extremely low by international 
standards, and even more so i f we take into account the size of 
the Amazon, s t i l l , what has been destroyed of the forest only in 
the present decade (47 million ha. according to the World Bank 
estimates mentioned in note 8 above) represents almost four times 
as much as what has been legally protected so far. 
Notwithstanding the need to improve our knowledge about the 
situation, i t must be noted that i t i s not the purpuse of this 
paper to study the ecological disorder of the Amazon in and of 
i t s e l f . There are undoubtedly important repercussions of the 
policies of occupation of the Amazon for the integrity of i t s 
ecosystems, as well as for the overall carrying capacity of the 
region. However, other, more competent experts w i l l surely 
contribute their expertise to the understanding these issues.10/ 
Our purpose here i s to focus on the institutional dimensions of 
ecological disorder, on how the p o l i t i c a l development of Brazil, 
and i t s bureaucratic p o l i t i c s in the environmental arena, 
composes the d i f f i c u l t i e s of facing the ecological challenges 
posed by the careless occupation of the Amazon. 
This approach assumes, as John Passmore points out, that an 
ecological problem cannot be confused with "a problem in 
ecology". The latter is essentially a s c i e n t i f i c problem, a 
question of understanding some particular ecological phenomena. 
Conversely, an ecological problem, is fundamentally a social 
problem. It i s not a question that presents obstacles to 
s c i e n t i f i c a l l y reckon with the laws of the natural world, but 
rather a problem that we believe society would be better off 
without i t in the f i r s t place. 11/ As a matter of fact, an 
adequate understanding of ecological disorder requires the 
recognition that the ecological outcomes of the way people use 
the earth's resources are ultimately related to the modes of 
relationships amongst people themselves. 
4 
I I . AN ECOPOLITICAL APPROACH TO ECOLOGICAL DISORDER 
In 1970, 300,000 persons died in Bangladesh when a cyclone drove 
a huge wave over the Ganges delta, in what has been described as 
the greatest natural disaster in history. In 1984 the world was 
struck by the image of millions of Ethiopians dying of 
starvation. How many North Americans w i l l perish when the San 
Andreas Fault moves once again sometime at the turn of the 
century? A l l of these situations can be predicted well in 
advance. The Ganges delta i s a f l a t lowland known for i t s 
climatic instability. At the beginning of the seventies Africa, 
which was essentially self-sufficient in food, began to show 
increasing signs of declining per capita grain production. And in 
1906 San Francisco was l i t e r a l l y destroyed by a major earthquake. 
Notwithstanding the fact that two of these examples refer to 
natural disasters beyond human control, they a l l show a dramatic 
failure to cope with the laws of nature. Even in the case of San 
Francisco and Bangladesh, one may argue that in allowing human 
concentration in such highly unstable environments we actually 
help those natural occurrences to become disasters. There are 
undoubtedly social and p o l i t i c a l variables that may explain this 
"failure," but the truth i s that there has been a persistent 
disregard, both by social scientists and by decisionmakers, of 
the rules that regulate the world surrounding us. These matters 
deserve our utmost attention in years to come, for, as Kenneth 
Boulding says, "No one i s going to repeal the second law of 
thermodynamics, not even the Democrats." 12/ Full appreciation of 
the present c r i s i s thus demands some knowledge of the basic 
principles of ecology. For our purposes, we should focus our 
attention in the concepts of equilibrium and of carriyng 
capacity, resiliency and diversity, since they apply more closely 
to the environmental situation of Brazil and of to the Amazon. 
1. "Ecopolitics". this troubled relationship 
between humans and nature 
Ecopolitics, both as a discipline and as a specific arena of 
p o l i t i c s , truly belongs to the society of the late twentieth 
century. How many centuries has humankind had to travel to 
discover that ecopolitics has been with us since the dawn of 
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time. Ever since Adam and Eve l e f t the Garden of Eden, for an 
ostensibly ecological act, human beings have had to struggle with 
the blessings and the curse also of ecopolitics. Yet, we s t i l l 
ignore the laws of ecology. We are particularly ignorant of the 
range of interconnections between human activ i t i e s and the cycles 
of nature. The fact that we are part of nature, and that nature 
is also part of our culture, only compounds our problems. Too, i t 
makes our attempts to harmonize p o l i t i c s and ecology, in our 
daily lives, even more clumsy. But the crude facts of l i f e t e l l 
us that the higher we rise in our technological society, the more 
Í intimate and demanding the relationships between ourselves and 
our forgotten nature become. And as the competition to grasp a 
greater share of resources goes unchecked, we place increasing 
strains upon the s t a b i l i t y of our institutions. 
To incorporate then an ecological framework into our 
economic and p o l i t i c a l decision-making—to take into account the 
implications of our public policies for the network of relations 
operating in ecosystems—may be a biological necessity. As A. F. 
Coventry once stated, "we have for a long time been breaking the 
l i t t l e laws, and the big laws are beginning to catch up with us."13/ 
But human beings do not function naturally, in a more or less 
automatic manner; they need conscious and deliberate actions to 
change course. By extension, an ecosocial system, which includes 
both natural and human systems, can transform i s t e l f only through 
the human a b i l i t y to set and seek a predetermined goal. To be 
able to understand the implications of the ecological (scarcity 
of resources) and environmental (scarcity of "pollutable" 
reservoirs) c r i s i s , one must attemp to grasp the social process 
behind i t . And the possible solutions to the current c r i s i s must 
be found within the social system i t s e l f . 
Another way to approach this reality i s to undescore the 
fact that goods and services, measured by the yardstick of human 
needs, are generally in a situation of scarcity. At the same 
time, interests and wants of individuals, groups and societies 
are being permanently redefined, in themselves as well as in 
relation to one another. From their definition follows the 
question of who gets what, when, how, and why. That i s what the 
study of p o l i t i c s i s a l l about. But because the most basic 
resources, such as the food we eat, the water we drink, the air 
we breathe, and the materials with which we build and equip our 
shelters, are a l l provided by natural processes, contemporary 
p o l i t i c s stands on the ecological foundations of society. 14/ 
Ecopolitics i s thus a short word for ecological p o l i t i c s . It 
emerges from the recognition that to overcome the ecological and 
environmental c r i s i s , p o l i t i c a l decisions w i l l have to be made. 
In this process some interests w i l l be favored over others, both 
within as well as between nations. No one should assume, however, 
that "ecopolitics" i s merely a new and catchy word, a marketing 
device for environmentalists. Hobbes, more than three hundred 
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years ago based his suggestion that some sort of c i v i l authority 
was necessary, otherwise conflict and chaos could result, on the 
fact that human wants are always unfulfilled due to the scarce 
nature of resources. He continues to be right. Scarcity was also 
at the core of the p o l i t i c a l thought of many philosophers before 
Hobbes. Plato (427-347 B.C.), for example, voiced concern with 
overgrazing and deforestation. He foresaw the need for a 
responsible p i l o t to run the otherwise unstable ship of the 
state, an e l i t e class led by his "philosopher-kings." His pupil 
Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) suggested that scarcity was the leading 
cause of poverty and social conflict. 
The use, however, of ecopolitics to label the study of the 
interplay between human activ i t i e s and natural systems i s of 
recent date. Karl Deutsch was probably among the f i r s t to 
classify in these terms this new f i e l d of the social sciences, 
which he called "ecosocial science" and "ecopolitics." According 
to his original definition, " i t asks about the v i a b i l i t y of 
ecological and social systems, singly and in their ecosocial 
interplay, and about the possibility, desirability and limits of 
p o l i t i c a l intervention." This approach rejects the romantic 
i l l u s i o n that a l l natural systems are necessarily viable, but i t 
does in s i s t that "no social system can remain viable for long i f 
i t degrades or destroys i t s natural environment, or i f i t f a i l s 
to save i t from deterioration or self-destruction. 15/ 
2. The abolition of the environment; The incorporation 
of nature into human culture 
When most writers describe the relationship between human beings 
and nature—in the Amazon or in other parts of the world—and 
particularly the notion of equilibrium that usually qualifies 
this relationship in normative terms, their prose often reads 
like ancient history. 16/ In fact, there has never been a more 
disruptive action, e c o l o g i c a l l y speaking, than that of 
domesticating animals and plants. Today, human beings and nature 
no longer exist apart. Nine thousand years ago humankind made the 
decision to overcome and control nature, indeed, to incorporate 
nature into their own culture. The environment i s now defined, 
manipulated, and in many ways, created by human beings. 
Certainly, the conquest of the environment has not been 
complete—at least not as complete as industrialized societies 
would l i k e — a n d environmental conditions s t i l l force human beings 
to adapt as well as to restrain their assaults upon nature. As 
Engels said long ago, "Let us not, however, be very hopeful about 
our human conquest over nature; for each such victory, nature 
manages to take her revenge." 17/ Notwithstanding this fact, over 
the millennia, the relationship between human beings and nature 
has become far from balanced. The human capacity to transform the 
environment i s immensely greater than the need to adapt to the 
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habitat. Edmund Leach, for instance, has unmistakenly concluded 
that "History does not show us that there has been a repeated 
failure to achieve a balanced relationship between human beings 
and the environment." There has not been such failure because i t 
i s only in the most extreme kinds of environment "that human 
beings of the past have been in any way motivated to achieve 
balance between their society and the environment." 18/ 
Despite that, too many people have assumed that although 
human beings are the supreme rulers of their world, natural 
systems must display some feedback mechanism that guarantees the 
return to a stable or homeostatic state. The idea of equilibrium 
represented, in this sense, a way of imposing i n t e l l i g i b l e order 
on the complex and confusing phenomena of l i f e . Whether or not 
ecological processes possessed any inherent tendency to arrive at 
equilibrium was not at issue. However, regardless of any 
heuristic value, does equilibrium reflect reality? A short answer 
would be a resounding Nol Or, to be f a i r , one should say that i t 
represents a very particular and limited portion of reality: the 
sporadic more than the usual, the ideal more than the tangible. 
The evidence i s overwhelming. In addition to E. Leach, already 
mentioned, Amos Hawley, the human ecologist par excellence, the 
same Hawley who said that equilibrium was central to Human 
Ecology, has also quickly acknowledged that "the old conception 
of organization of l i f e as a 'balance of nature' implying a 
highly stable system of relationships has been modified as a 
result of empirical investigation." 19/ Most scholars who 
subscribe to this view base their interpretations on the work of 
Charles Elton, the British naturalist who extensively studied the 
patterns of regulation in animal populations. His indisputable 
conclusion was that "the impression of anyone who has studied 
animal numbers i s that the 'balance of nature' hardly exists, 
except in the minds of scientists." 20/ 
Furthermore, i t i s usually forgotten that one of the 
distinctive features of human systems, as opposed to any other 
"system," but especially to ecosocial systems, i s the existence 
of culture. To bring culture into the picture means to question 
seriously the idea of automatic controls, for feedback is now 
understood to be completely subjected to the cognitively defined 
world of human events and actions. As a matter of fact, i f we 
decide to accept the rule of equilibrium, the ultimate goal of 
our environmental policies would be what Bertalanffy defined as 
"a well-oiled robot maintaining i t s e l f on optimal biological, 
psychological, and social homeostasis," 21/ something that even 
the most radical environmental advocate would probably not be 
willing to propose. Only when the myth of ecological equilibrium 
i s properly debunked, especially in i t s alleged application to 
the social sciences, we can more f u l l y appreciate the ecological 
roots of the present c r i s i s facing the Amazon. 
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3. The abolition of the human race: Carrying capacity 
and the environmental c r i s i s 
Present environmental problems have derived most fundamentally 
from two interrelated elements of human evolution: technology and 
population growth. 22/ As indicated earlier, because mere people 
are alive today than ever before, we use more resources and use 
them more rapidly than any previous c i v i l i z a t i o n . We also produce 
more wastes more rapidly than ever before. The Agricultural 
Révolution paved the way for the emergence of c i t i e s ; and with 
the advent of the Industrial Revolution c i t i e s became more and 
more a r t i f i c i a l , human-made ecosystems, remotely dependent on 
their resource base. But as improved technology made the 
environment more livable in many ways, i t also brought dramatic, 
i f i n i t i a l l y slow, changes in our surroundings. 
Ecological disorder can thus be equated, in the f i r s t place, 
with new and complex forms of scarcity, with the using up of 
resources to an extent unprecedented in the history of 
humankind. With the extinction of many species and the exhaustion 
of natural resources, even the distinction between renewable and 
nonrenewable resources becomes ludicrous. What we confront now i s 
both relative and absolute scarcity. Also, the generation of new 
wastes compounds the burden of excessive human claims on the 
resource base. On one hand, they tend to simplify ecosyst^s. On 
the other, they tend to overload ecosystems. Both dimensions 
invoke the idea of ecological equilibrium. Having discarded the 
old notion of a natural stable state, a new concept i s in order: 
that of carrying capacity. 
Several definitions can be found in the literature, but they 
a l l assume that ecosystems, be they natural or made by people, 
display a limited capacity to support l i f e . The carrying capacity 
of an ecosystem thus represents the maximum number of a given 
species that can be supported at any time and under a specific 
set of environmental conditions. It can be measured in both 
absolute and relative terms, and i t i s also a function of social 
and economic variables, or the "style of development" of any 
society. This concept undoubtedly reflects reality far better 
than does equilibrium. For one thing, i t t e l l s us that any 
ecosystem, when disturbed, w i l l not try to return to a 
predisturbance state but, rather, w i l l attempt to maintain i t s 
integrity in the long run. This also implies that i t s carrying 
capacity may change through time. The notion of resiliency i s a 
direct corollary of "carrying capacity." It stands for the 
a b i l i t y of an ecosystem to recover from disturbance. This was in 
some ways insinuated i n the previous discussion about 
equilibrium, when i t was argued that this condition has never 
existed in nature, although every system strives to maintain i t s 
integrity. What was missing there was precisely the notion of 
resiliency. Because ecosystems vary widely in complexity (due in 
most instances to ecological constraints), their " f r a g i l i t y " 
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depends on the possibilities for recovery from disruptive changes 
rather than on that imagined and arbitrarily defined state. 
Consequently, one may consider the highly complex Amazon 
system as "stable," yet displaying a limited carrying capacity, 
or very low resiliency. Again, what is the use of describing the 
Amazon in terms of equilibrium? What does i t reveal about i t s 
characteristics? Nothing. On the other hand, describing the 
Amazon in terms of i t s carrying capacity, or i t s low resiliency, 
t e l l s us much, especially i f we are to base resource exploration 
and human settlement on these descriptions. This leads to a final 
concept, directly related to the ecological complexity of a 
system: diversity. Unfortunately, economic activities tend to 
simplify ecosystems, favoring specialization. Humankind has been 
forced to do so in many ways, agricultural production being just 
one of many. However, i t i s oversimplification—as a result of, 
say, monoculture, or the transformation of large tracts of 
tropical forest into pastureland—that causes most damage, for, 
as Eugene Odum has neatly stated, "Diversity i s a necessity, not 
just the spice of life."23/ This applies precisely to the Amazon, 
which houses the single most important genetic pool on Earth. 24/ 
Almost four hundred years ago Sir Francis Bacon, the noted 
English philosopher, predicated that nature, to be commanded, 
must be obeyed. Unfortunately, Brazilian planners s t i l l resist 
facing this reality. We must recognize, however, that the issue 
is not whether the development of new activities accommodate to 
the overall carrying capacity of the Amazon but how we do so. 
Then and only then may we responsibly, neither overoptimistically 
nor apocalyptically understand that ecological disorder in the 
Amazon, of which the current squandering of resources is simply 
one sympton, entails the possibility of breakdown but also new 
opportunities for advancement. An awareness about the principles 
of ecology leads to the recognition that every human activity has 
an ecological cost attached to i t , which means that any 
intervention in natural systems and processes cannot ignore the 
carrying capacity, resiliency, and diversity of the ecological 
resource base. To proceed otherwise is to court disaster. It also 
emphasizes the need to understand the h o l i s t i c nature of l i f e : 
biological, economic, social, and p o l i t i c a l l i f e , that i s . 
Assuming that the foregoing observations have not done too 
much injustice to ecology, and with the expectation also that 
these remarks w i l l bear f r u i t in the ensuing analysis, attention 
must now focus on three dimensions of the Amazonian ecological 
disorder: the ecopolitical implications of Brazil's p o l i t i c a l 
development; the ecological underpinnings of the government's 
traditional stance in international affairs; and the bureaucratic 
aspects of environmental policy formation in that country. 
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I I I . ECOLOGICAL DISORDER IN BRAZIL ( 1 ) : 
SOCIAL FORMATION AND ECOPOLITICS 
It has been stressed the fact that to understand adequately the 
inner workings of an ecosocial system such as the Amazon, i t i s 
crucial that we explore the p o l i t i c a l dimension of these 
relationships. These are undoubtedly important theoretical 
pursuits, which c a l l for diversified analytical paths. These 
range from the integrated study of public policies to the 
detailed exploration of the elements that make up a p o l i t i c a l 
system—such as s o c i a l s t r a t i f i c a t i o n , modes of interest 
aggregation and representation, popular participation, and 
decision-making processes. However, this sort of understanding 
can come only after one acquires a historical perspective on how 
economic interests, social classes, and the p o l i t i c a l and 
institutional structure have evolved in i t s recent past. 
1. The "paradox" of the Brazilian social formation 
Brazilian society i s a typical example of "parallax view" at 
work. The parallax effect, a concept borrowed from astronomy, 
optics and other heavenly sciences to help unfold social reality 
in Brazil, indicates the apparent change in the position of an 
object resulting from the change in the position from which i t i s 
observed. This may indeed be the best way to describe Brazil. It 
also explains most of the differences between the visions offered 
by several observers, both Brazilian and "Brazilianists" alike, 
at different moments of the country's development. 
Despite the apparent d i f f i c u l t y of characterizing the 
process of social formation in Brazil, i t s most important 
elements are quite straightforward: hierarchy, paternalism, 
repression, and authoritarianism, alone or combined in different 
ways. Being p a t e r n a l i s t i c , B r a z i l i s also an extremely 
formalistic society, where rules and regulations are much more 
important than facts. Until recently a citizen was required to 
get a certificate of "being alive" in order to pursue several 
procedures with the State; the citizen could not simply appear 
in front of the bureaucrat. Also, in a society at the same time 
paternalistic and repressive, there i s always a "Big Father" to 
be reverenced—often a personification of the State through a 
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demagogic l e a d e r — i n contraposition to the depersonalized masses. 
This situation has led to the c l i e n t e l i s t i c practices epitomized 
in the contradictions of the mere "citizen", who i s to be treated 
according to the law, and the "person", who i s to be treated 
according to his or her "connections"—the (in)famous ieitinho 
brasileiro [the Brazilian f i x, sometimes euphemistically referred 
to as "creative imagination"]. The combination of a l l these 
elements produces a formalistic, depersonalized, Brazil, one that 
flourishes in the same territory as the Brazil that i s an open 
society that ignores laws and regulations and that favors kinship 
and clientelism, and whose preferred form of treatment is 
companheiro, amizade. and tudo bem [fellow, friend, and 
everything's O.K.]. At the same time, Brazilian society also 
appears in many respects traditional and closed ( i f one is 
willing to leave Rio's beaches and look around). These apparently 
contradictory dimensions relate to the same society. This i s not 
the "dual" society that some describe the country to be, no 
matter how schizophrenic Brazil's tropical latitudes may appear 
to the unprepared observer. 
The most distinctive element in the social formation of 
Brazil i s undoubtedly the bureaucracy. The bourgeoisie was 
dominant, i t was f i r s t commercial, swinging back and forth 
between agrarian and industrial factions, and f i n a l l y i t became 
industrial. The State bureaucracy and the the Church hierarchy 
were predominant in society even i f the military exercised more 
or less dominance at the p o l i t i c a l level, according to the 
changes in the ruling e l i t e . Above and beyond these elements, 
however, the most dominant, structural facet of Brazilian 
p o l i t i c a l development has been the presence of patrimonialism, a 
bureaucratic order more than a bureaucratic State, encompassing 
both public and private dimensions. 25/ The patrimonial order is 
usually referred to by i t s concrete p o l i t i c a l practices of social 
control, such as clientelism, patronage, or cooptation, which 
combine elements of paternalism, repression, hierarchy, and the 
authority to rule and stand above social classes. The "estate" 
bureaucracy, administrative apparatus, and general staff of the 
patrimonial order should not be confused with the "State" 
bureaucracy, the " e l i t e , " or the "ruling class." The bureaucracy 
does not constitute a class in and of i t s e l f , although more often 
than not i t acts as a surrogate of the e l i t e . It may well stand 
above dominant classes, but i t does not enjoy autonomy over 
society. Conversely, however, even i f the composition of the 
e l i t e changes, the patrimonial order persists. 
As Raymundo Faoro explains, this bureaucratic "caste" 
develops a pendular movement that often misleads the observer. It 
turns against the landowner in favor of the middle classes; 
alternatively, i t turns for or against the proletariat. Also, the 
bureaucratic apparatus may be modernizing or conservative. It may 
favor the p l u r a l i s t i c aspects of democracy, through direct 
representation, or i t may enhance patronage and cooptation. These 
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apparent behaviors are actually optical illusions suggested by 
the projection of modern ideologies and r e a l i t i e s upon a past 
that i s h i s t o r i c a l l y consistent within the f l u i d i t y of i t s 
mechanisms. For the estate patrimonial structure, therefore, 
social formations are mobile points of support. The masses, the 
people, or whatever name one wishes to give to the majority of 
the population, have lent their support at every episodic change 
of the ruling alliance. But they do so much as those in the 
stands "help" their soccer team win a championship. The fact 
remains that a l l conflict resolution in Brazilian p o l i t i c s has 
taken place within the confines of the e l i t e . Some, like Dom 
Pedro I, have candidly recognized that. The emperor once said 
that he would "do everything for the people, but nothing by the 
people." 26/ Most politicians, however, have tried to disguise 
the patrimonial order with popular colors. 
In short, Brazil may have been transformed from the agrarian 
and merchant society of colonial times into one of the most 
advanced industrial and capitalist society in the Third World. 
Yet, i t s s o c i a l formation w i l l probably never lose i t s 
patrimonial cast. This may reinforce i t s authoritarian features 
at times. At other times, the social formation may tend to free 
the infant, atrophied, participatory and egalitarian inclinations 
of Brazil. Bvit the weight of tradition tends to perpetuate 
elitism, and move Brazil to be ever more stat i s t than i t would 
otherwise be. The patrimonial society of Brazil must puzzle the 
superficial observer. Its schizophrenic t r a i t s reveal themselves 
i n c a t a t o n i c syndromes, often a l t e r n a t i n g phases of 
(authoritarian) stupor with phases of (democratic) excitement, 
but the muscular (bureaucratic) r i g i d i t y is always present. 
2. The Brazilian State, a Portuguese Oedipus? 
It i s very d i f f i c u l t to present an image of the State that 
captures the characteristics, and yet the singularity, of the 
Brazilian case. Perhaps the best way i s to make use of the joke 
on how the Portuguese subtitled a film on Sophocles's tragedy 
about the son of Laius and Jocasta. 27/ Some say that following 
the Portuguese tradition of pulling the piano instead of pushing 
the s t o o l — t h e surest way of determining the pianist's 
n a t i o n a l i t y — i t went something like this: "Oedipus: The son who 
k i l l e d his father, slept with his mother, and ended up blind." 
The abridged version read: "Oedipus, the son who became father." 
If something sums up the Brazilian State i t i s this version 
of Oedipus. No wonder Sophocles made i t into a tragedy. Whereas 
in the vast majority of today's countries the State follows the 
préexistence of a more or less organized society, in Brazil i t 
happened the other way around. In Spanish America, for example, 
the colonial administration was superimposed upon a native 
society that, in many places, displayed levels of social 
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organization that were as complex as in Spain. In Brazil the 
Indian population, compared to the rest of the region, was rela-
tively sparse, and at the end of the twentieth century i t has 
been a l l but annihilated. The f i r s t general-governor of Brazil, 
Tomé de Souza, arrived in 1549 already with a government 
structure, laws and regulations, and even with a constitution, 
the Regimento de Almeirim prepared in Portugal one year earlier. 
These had a l l been derived from the institutional system of 
Portugal, and they were to be implemented in a Brazil without 
Brazilians yet—the Indians have never been considered citizens. 
The Brazilian State was, so to speak, part of Tomé de Souza «s 
luggage. A perfect example of the Portuguese Oedipus. This 
situation prevailed at least until the 1930s, when, despite some 
profound changes experienced by the society, basically the same 
institutional framework remained in force. The Portuguese court 
was transferred to Brazil in 1808, independence came in 1822, the 
empire collapsed in 1889, but the legal statutes of the colonial 
period s t i l l applied, from the Ordenações Manuelinas (1548-1603) 
to the ordenações Filipinas (1603-1916). 
This explains most of the elements of the social formation 
described above. The patrimonial, bureaucratic character of the 
State has imposed, and w i l l probably continue to impose, i t s own 
limits on the constitution of society, giving i t the distinctive 
features of formalism, bureaucratism, and authoritarianism. There 
has been such a concentration of power in the hands of the State 
that the broader c i v i l society has had very l i t t l e room to 
organize i t s e l f , to form autonomous channels for interest 
articulation and representation. The l i t t l e i t may have had has 
often been co-opted or simply suppressed. On the other hand, the 
p o l i t i c a l society (the Legislative, party system, and electoral 
processes) i t s e l f has not been able to represent the plurality of 
interests existing in Brazilian society at large. In short, to 
the social formation of Brazil, as well as to the formation of 
the Brazilian State, corresponds a power structure that is 
concentrated and exclusionary; decison-making processes that 
respond to the particular interests of the best organized groups 
of society; and, f i n a l l y , a strong technocratic, hierarchical, 
and formalistic pattern of conflict resolution. 
Insofar as ecopolitics is concerned, the obstacles posed by 
the particular process of social formation in Brazil seem to be 
rather obvious. Nevertheless, there are several aspects of i t 
that, in addition to authoritarianism, elitism and bureaucratism, 
make understanding more cumbersome. First of a l l , we should take 
note of the l e g a l i s t i c tradition of Brazilian p o l i t i c s . Laws, 
decrees and administrative orders regulate the l i f e of Brazilians 
to such an extent that they even blur the frontiers between 
public and private affairs. Reality, to be accepted as such, must 
be f i r s t imagined by the State. Before the presidencies of 
Getúlio Vargas (1930-45, 1951-54), for example, the mobilization 
of the working classes was considered to be mostly a "police 
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problem." Their unions became legitimized only when the state 
bestowed i t s recognition upon them, thereby defining their action 
in i t s own terms and according to i t s corporatist interests. A 
second aspect, a corollary of the l e g a l i s t i c tradition, is the 
compulsion to have every minuscule aspect of l i f e , public or 
private, foreseen, regulated, enshrined in the law. Brazil has so 
many laws, regulations, statutes, and ordinances, that i t i s said 
that the most effective solution to a l l of the country's problems 
would be one single law making a l l previous ones mandatory.28/ 
But because Brazilians are proud to be "the largest Catholic 
country in the world," while church attendance must be among the 
lowest, and while candomblé, umbanda p and other Afro-Brazilian 
rituals claim increasing numbers of followers, so their worship 
of the state i s also blended with a certain dose of iconoclasm. 
A l l of this should not add more confusion. The State i s the 
source of much of what concerns the individual, in private or 
public l i f e . To be somehow connected with the Sate i s , therefore, 
a source of prestige and social status. Moreover, as a general 
rule, to be a public servant has a very special meaning in 
Brazil. Rather than "serving the public," i t means to serve one's 
own interest—through co-optation and p o l i t i c a l control—at the 
public expense. The net result i s too well known to deserve 
further comments here: a tightly controlled society, corruption, 
and the distribution of privileges. S t i l l , i t must be underlined 
that corruption may assume a multitude of forms. It may represent 
direct payment in exchange for a favor, or i t may be a specific 
way of making l i f e easier without necessarily being i l l e g a l . This 
should not alarm anyone, since, in many instances, the "Brazilian 
f i x " may well be a powerful weapon against the discretionary 
powers of the State. Ecopolitically, the most important type of 
corruption i s the "structural" variety. Because to survive and to 
be kept in State favor one should not cause too many problems, i t 
is no surprise that governmental agencies and State enterprises 
in Brazil are generally the worst environmental offenders. The 
State sector i s the f i r s t to claim environmental awareness, but 
i t i s also the f i r s t one to shove problems under the rug. 
3. What Sophocles did not see, the technobureaucracy 
The civilian-military regime installed in Brazil after 1964 can 
be expressed in very simple terms. It represented the alliance of 
the financial and industrial bourgeoisie with multinational 
i n t e r e s t s . The agrarian and commercial elements of the 
bourgeoisie now occupied the back seats. The working classes 
were, of course, excluded. What has made this alliance 
possible—or, more candidly, what enabled the rule of the 
dominant classes—was the existence of a well-trained, 
specialized, and willing technocracy, both c i v i l i a n and military. 
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But the technobureaucrat i s not merely a recent actor in 
Brazil. S t r i c t l y speaking, the position was born in 1821, when 
Dom João VI went back to Portugal, and posts had to be f i l l e d in 
the administrative apparatus that the court l e f t behind. Its 
teenage years probably began in the 1930s, when the State started 
to take planning seriously, thereby allowing for the outgrowth of 
the technician's rebellious, "modernizing" s p i r i t . As with most 
teenage manifestations, the noise of this group was stronger than 
i t s real influence, and the traditional, cabide de emprego 
[ l i t e r a l l y , employment hanger], bureaucracy, s t i l l overshadowed 
the early, striving version of the "new man." The real emergence 
of the technobureaucracy, as a p o l i t i c a l and as a social actor, 
came about under the military after 1964, almost as a State 
within the State, by-passing the old bureaucrats and abolishing 
interest articulation through p o l i t i c a l parties and politicians. 
Not surprisingly, among the f i r s t tasks of the new government was 
the unprecedented administrative reform of 1966-67. 
Until 1964 public service was a prestigious but low-paid 
job; for most bureaucrats actually a second or third job. After 
the military takeover, attention was given to technicians 
(professional experts) over bureaucrats (traditional public 
servants), i.e., to a new caste of technobureaucrats. Beyond the 
semantics involved, the main difference between the two groups 
was that the bureaucrat strove to maintain the status quo, and 
the technicians were deeply committed to reform and change. These 
technocrats value economic development over social and p o l i t i c a l 
development, and reveal an ideological cohesion with their 
counterparts in the private sector, not only at the abstract 
level of shared interest in capitalist accumulation but also at 
the concrete level of shared faith in corporate growth and 
p r o f i t a b i l i t y as the primary measures of success. 
Needless to say, the particular way the technobureaucracy 
evolved in Brazil, especially after 1964, i s of significance for 
ecopolitics. For one thing, the "private" orientation of dominant 
technobureaucrats does not collide with the overriding presence 
of the State in the economy. Rather than representing a weakening 
of the patrimonial order, the post-1964 regime actually made i t 
stronger. The result i s that State agents end up subverting the 
use of resources that belong to the entire nation, promoting 
their exploitation according to the corporate ideology. On the 
other hand, by substituting economic for p o l i t i c a l variables, 
and by subsuming both to "technical" c r i t e r i a , the regime has 
been able effectively to neutralize, to sanitize, environmental 
issues. Finally, the technobureaucracy has attained what we may 
c a l l a "relative autonomy" over the interests of different social 
groups. Making this situation even more disquieting, the State 
looks upon any mobilization of society around environmental 
issues with great suspicion. These aspects w i l l be further 
analyzed when we look at the bureaucratic p o l i t i c s of 
environmental policy formation. 
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IV. ECOLOGICAL DISORDER IN BRAZIL ( 2 ) : 
"RESPONSIBLE PRAGMATISM" SPELLS ECOPOLITICAL DISASTER 
In the same year that a new disease was incorporated into the 
medical vocabulary, the so-called Minamata disease—named after 
the Japanese bay whose waters had become heavily contaminated 
with mercury—and following the worldwide attention, the year 
before, to the disaster of the Torrey Canyon, a tanker that 
spilled thousand of tons of o i l near the British coast, the 
government of Swe^den submitted a proposal to a l l nations of the 
world. Subscribed by the United Nations Economic and Social 
Council (ECOSOC), i t declared an urgent need for international 
action at the national and international level, to limit and, 
where possible, to eliminate the impairment of the human 
environment." Endorsing the ECOSOC recommendation, the General 
Assembly decided to convene the United Nations Conference on the 
Human Environment, in Stockholm, in June 1972. 29/ 
The way in which the objectives of the conference were 
i n i t i a l l y set forth betrayed the unmistakably F i r s t World 
character of the meeting. It emphasis was on the technical 
aspects of environmental contamination due to accelerated 
industrialization and urbanization, and on the relations between 
population growth and natural resource depletion. Hence, i t 
should cause no surprise the suspicion, i f not open h o s t i l i t y of 
several Third World countries toward the Stockholm agenda. As an 
Indian o f f i c i a l , stated in a preparatory meeting in Puerto Rico, 
"The wealthy worry about car fumes; we worry about 
starvation." 30/ Considering that Brazil was one of the leaders 
of this approach during the conference, and considering also that 
the perspective adopted by Brazil has considerable bearing for 
the current international debate on the Amazon, a summary 
examination of i t s basic tenets i s in order. 
1. A view from the periphery; Brazil at Stockholm 
We should not, as some journalists did at that time, dismiss the 
performance of Brazilian delegates before and during the 
Stockholm conference as obstructionist and antienvironmentalist. 
The fact i s that a l l the major issues defended by Brazil, with 
only the exception of i t s dispute with Argentina over the 
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construction of Itaipú, were endorsed by other Third World 
countries, including the endorsement of Maurice Strong himself, 
the secretary-general of the conference. 31/ 
The perspective adopted by Brazil regarding environmental 
issues was quite straightforward. 32/ First, Brazilian delegates 
advocated that economic growth should not be sacrificed in the 
name of a cleaner environment. They acknowledged the growing 
menace of environmental pollution, but suggested that developed 
countries should pay for the clean-up efforts. Second, Brazil, as 
well as many Third World contries, did not share the postulate of 
a direct relationship between population growth and exhaustion of 
natural resources, strongly opposing the widespread appplication 
of measures population control. A third important element of the 
Brazilian position, that national sovereignty could not be 
surrendered in the name of "ill-defined environmental interests," 
provoked much controversy. In light of frequent denunciations of 
the widespread destruction in the Amazon, many viewed Brazil's 
stand as disguised antienvironmentalism. In fact, i t was referred 
to a permanent dimension of contemporary Brazilian foreign 
policy: international cooperation should not be used as a means 
for the encroachment of foreign interests upon national affairs. 
For Brazil, the environmental problems faced by the world 
deserved the attention of a l l governments, even though some 
nations exploited these issues for their own p o l i t i c a l purposes. 
In other words, although the government took environmental 
problems seriously, they were approached from a different angle, 
i.e., that of their relationship to development. Tom Sanders 
accurately captures the peculiarity of the Brazilian position, 
noting that because development was one of the ideological bases 
of the military regime, tightly linked with national security, i t 
came as a logical consequence that environmental problems were 
measured with the yardstick of economic growth. 33/ The best 
opportunity for the government , to express these views came 
through the Panel of Experts on Development and Environment, 
which met in Founex, Switzerland, from 4 to 12 June 1971. In what 
became known as the Founex Report, 34/ i t was made clear that 
environmental issues should be an integral part of the 
development process, stating that i f in advanced countries i t was 
appropriate "to view development as a cause of environmental 
problems," in the context of Third World countries "development 
becomes essentially a cure for their major environmental 
problems." It i s , to say the least, striking to see the 
resemblance between, on the one hand, i t s conclusions and 
recommendations and, on the other, the positions that had long 
been advocated by Brazilian delegates. 
Ambassador Miguel Ozório de Almeida was the leading 
spokesman of the government's stand, and his poignant remarks 
soon became a trademark of Brazilian participation before and 
during the conference. In an article published at the same time 
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that the Founex Report was issued, ¿5/ Ambassador Almeida drew 
the widely quoted distinction between relative and absolute 
pollution. He tried to show that because the great polluters were 
highly industrialized countries, even i f a l l pollution generated 
in developing countries could be eliminated, a l l the dangers 
linked to pollution would continue to exist in practically the 
same densities, calling i t even a "happy coincidence" that the 
largest sources of pollution were in nations that also had the 
most important technological and economic resources to combat 
that pollution. Hence, those countries not only should commit 
themselves to taking the necessary national measures but should 
also finance much needed research on environmental matters. 
According to this perspective, environmental problems at the 
periphery were due to "large numbers of human beings l i v i n g in 
poverty," and developing countries were in fact victims of 
worldwide pollution generated by a lack of planning in the major 
i n d u s t r i a l economies. Developing countries would therefore 
approve measures necessary to correct that situation, but they 
could not sacrifice their only effective way of overcoming the 
"pollution of poverty," that i s , accelerated economic growth. 
Another aspect of the Brazilian position at Stockholm, a 
controversial one as well, referred to the projections that 
concrete limits to the earth's physical resources were rapidly 
approaching, and that s t r i c t measures of population control were 
therefore called for. Much of the argument could be summarized as 
follows. First, the assumption that a l l countries have a share of 
the earth's resources was, according to the Brazilian government, 
absolutely false. Second, environmental problems in the periphery 
were associated not with overuse but with the insufficient use of 
available resources. Moreover, the lack of knowledge about the 
relationship between environment (pollution) and development 
(economic growth) could be applied also to the uncertainty with 
respect to potential resources. Finally, a prescription for 
generalized population control that did not take into account the 
relationships between population and the magnitude of resources, 
and national demographic densities as well, was not only i r -
responsible but morally reprehensible. 
Adopting a stand that appears most germane to the current 
debate on the Amazon, Brazil argued that the suggestion that 
natural resources formed a common pool, shared by a l l peoples of 
the world, was, "of course, a very beautiful assumption, but i t 
would f i t better in the institutional framework of a world 
government, and we should not forget that we are s t i l l very far 
from this idea." 36/ It was unrealistic to pretend that certain 
resources, such as the Amazon, belonged to humankind as a whole, 
when in fact they were located within national jurisdictions. If 
indeed resources could be shared in a kind of "World Trust" by 
a l l peoples, then, Brazil advocated, economic power, industrial 
productivity, and financial control should also be shared. 
Because developed countries found the latter unthinkable, less 
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developed countries should find the former unthinkable as well. 
Complementing this artful use of li b e r a l economic precepts, 
Brazilian delegates shifted the attention of the conference to 
what they described as "the irreversible but unnecessary loss of 
resources such as plant and animal species." 
Finally, measures of population control were the focus of 
strong opposition, and Brazil successfully blocked any explicit 
recommendations on this subject. The basis of the Brazilian 
argument was that for some countries with low demographic density 
or with a large resource base (and Brazil had both) i t simply did 
not make sense to impose generalized restrictions. In addition to 
that, the Brazilian delegation attached a strong moral judgment 
to these technical arguments, hinting that those countries that 
supported population control were clearly oriented by a narrow, 
selfi s h sense of convenience rather than by any s c i e n t i f i c a l l y 
sound or environmentally superior motivations. According to this 
view, the Stockholm conference was running the risk of being 
permeated by "a Calvinistic approach" to demographic problems. In 
the orthodoxy of this approach, the developed countries were 
thought to have demonstrated, by their development, their right 
to salvation and perpetuation, thus passing on to the more 
numerous underdeveloped peoples the responsibility for creating 
the necessary space on earth. The latter should, the argument 
supposedly implied, stop breeding and encroaching upon others' 
enjoyment of nature and natural resources. In short, in the name 
of humankind's survival, developing countries should remain 
underdeveloped "because i f the evils of industrialization were to 
reach them, l i f e on the planet would be placed in jeopardy." 37/ 
2. The primacy of national sovereignty over 
international cooperation 
The principle of national sovereignty, the right of a nation to 
exploit i t s natural resources according to i t s own p r i o r i t i e s , 
was, as Jon McLin says, "obsessively asserted by Brazil." 38/ And 
there was more than enough reason to be so obsessed by i t . Long 
before the conference, Brazilians knew that the dispute with 
Argentina over the use of the Rio da Prata basin would occupy a 
central position during the debates. The Argentine diplomacy had 
done a superb job before the conference already, and Argentina 
could count on several Third World countries in Latin America and 
in Africa to endorse i t s claims. 
Ba s i c a l l y , what Argentina wanted was to include a 
disposition in Principle 20 of the draft Declaration binding a l l 
States to supply information on i t s development plans whenever 
there was reason to believe that this information might avoid 
risks "beyond their national jurisdiction." Incidentally, as 
Brazilian o f f i c i a l s later acknowledged, i t was precisely in 
anticipation of this that the delegation had concentrated so much 
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effort on successfully reinforcing those parts of the Action Plan 
that dealt with national sovereignty and the exploration of 
natural resources. Brazil was also successful in i t s introduction 
of several amendments that increased the freedom of countries, 
particularly in their use of river basins within their borders. 
Put simply, Brazil went to Stockholm ready to fight for what i t 
considered a legitimate position, but the Brazilian delegation 
prepared as vrell for any retreat that might become necessary. 39/ 
The Brazilian delegation was instructed to adopt three 
t a c t i c a l maneuvers. First, i t offered fourteen amendments to the j 
Declaration, to give the impression that i f the i n i t i a l draft 
were not accepted, a stalemate would ensue, something that the 
secretary-general could not afford at that point. Second, i t 
tried to postpone as long as possible the work of the ad hoc 
committee formed to review the Declaration, as proposed on the 
f i r s t day of the conference by the Chinese delegation. Finally, 
Brazilian delegates fought to have the Declaration approved by 
consensus, which would give veto power to every delegation. In a 
clear i l l u s t r a t i o n that in ecopolitics much more p o l i t i c s than 
ecology i s actually involved, a l l the components of the Brazilian 
tactic seem to have worked. The formation of the Working Group on 
the Declaration on the Human Environment was effectively delayed 
for three days. This was an important victory, considering the 
tight schedule of the conference, which placed increased pressure 
on everyone to arrive at some acceptable solution. On another 
level, the added confusion of the several amendments offered by 
Brazil were playing into the hands of Brazilian interests. 
According to o f f i c i a l sources, the secretary-general less than 
three days before the closing of the conference, confided that he 
did not believe that a Stockholm declaration was possible. 
On the eve of the closing ceremony, two principles were 
s t i l l being hotly debated: one involved the Argentine-Brazilian 
dispute, and the other called for the immediate elimination and 
complete destruction of nuclear weapons. The final meeting of the 
working group ended at 5 o'clock in the morning, after nineteen 
hours of continuous debate, in a decision that clearly favored 
Brazil. Both Argentine and Brazilian texts were to be referred to 
the General Assmebly. As to Principle 26 on nuclear weapons, i t 
was reduced to a simple exhortation to put an end to the arms 
race. Brazilian delegates knew that in the General Assembly they » 
stood a better chance of getting a resolution to the dispute more 
akin to their interests. They made s k i l l f u l yet bold use of hal-
truths and semantic subtleties that effectively shook their 
opponent's confidence, managing to neutralize Argentina's 
demands. The text of the current Principle 21 can be viewed 
essentially as a compromise, but considering that Argentina never 
accepted i t in the f i r s t place and attempted to overrule i t 
during the conference, i t represented one more victory for the 
host of positions defended by Brazil at Stockholm. 
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Consequently, basic elements of Brazilian foreign policy 
came out of Stockholm victorious, so that they shaped 
environmental policies as well. Moreover, the Stockholm debates 
also reveal that beneath every discussion of environmental 
matters, at the international as well as at the national level, 
one always finds a p o l i t i c a l foundation. As the Brazilian 
p o s i t i o n at Stockholm indicates with transparency, the 
environmental argument can only on a very abstract level be 
subsumed under a discussion of the technical aspects of a 
"sector" of governmental activity callled "environment". Most of 
the time what is actually involved in those arguments are 
questions of power, social and economic differences, cultural 
practices, values, and ideology. Hence, i f we want seriously to 
analyze episodes like the current worldwide debate concerning the 
ecological disorder of the Amazon, we should keep questions of 
p o l i t i c s and p o l i t i c a l competition centrally in mind. As far as 
the Brazilian government is concerned, we should also keep in 
mind that national security interest esxpress i t s e l f in a s t r i c t 
exercise of sovereign rights. The implementation of the principle 
of sovereignty defended at Stockholm has been translated, in the 
environmental f i e l d , into a stubborn resistance to engage in 
international and especially multilateral a c t i v i t i e s . 40/ 
3. The logic of Orwellian authoritarianism 
George Orwell in his b r i l l i a n t post-World War II novel about the 
horrors of l i f e and s p i r i t under totalitarian regimes anticipates 
several features of modern p o l i t i c a l systems. 41/ Repressive and 
more open, pluralist societies alike have rendered the novel in 
many aspects less horrifying than reality. Among these elements 
"double-talk," "double-speak," and "doublethink" stand out. 
Orwell, whose essay on the English language remains a classic of 
the genre, here defines a peculiar, government-sanctioned idiom, 
also a way of thinking, where concepts and their meanings are 
completely inverted. In 1984. there was a Ministry of Peace to 
wage permanent wars around the world, a Ministry of Love to 
i n s t i l l hatred amongst citizens, a Ministry of Truth to rewrite 
history and transform yesterday's l i e into today's reality. 
Nobody would be naive enough to hint that Orwell drew 
inspiration from the Giant of the South. Some basic "tropical" 
ingredients, such as those analyzed in the section on Brazilian 
social formation, are conspicuously missing in his gloomy 
scenario. However, with respect to ecopolitics, Brazil was and 
s t i l l i s a diligent student of Orwellian authoritarianism. Many 
elements of the Brazilian p o l i t i c a l system transcend particular 
regimes and governments. In this sense, one of the most stable 
and enduring aspects of p o l i t i c s in Brazil, especially in recent 
decades, has been i t s foreign policy. Euphemistically termed 
"responsible pragmatism," i t represents the combination of active 
support for Third World causes, a strong commitment to the West, 
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and a persistent avoidance of so-called automatic alignments. A l l 
this comes under the core policy principle of subordinating 
ideology to the power-oriented rea l i t i e s of the world. Probably 
in no other area of governmental policies does one find such a 
high degree of coherence throughout the country's history. 
However, i f success at Stockholm can be attributed to a 
fortunate conjunction of c i v i l i a n policies of "responsible 
pragmatism" and military projects of "world power," the internal, 
ecopolitical result could not have been more "Orwellian" and 
hence disastrous. In a masterful display of double-talk and 
doublethink, Brazilian delegates emotionally denounced the 
emergence of neocolonialism from the North. At the same time, the 
Brazilian government's lack of constructive policies toward the 
Northeast, not only in terms of economic and social conditions 
but also in relation to the exploration of the region's natural 
resources, amounted to open, undisguised practices of internal 
colonialism. At the precise moment when i t was strongly 
condemning the Calvinist attitude of the superpowers, i t was also 
condoning, i f not practicing, the extermination of native 
populations to allow the penetration of the Amazon. 
In another example of double-talk, Brazil successfully 
argued in Stockholm for a more adequate understanding of the 
relationships between environment and development, c r i t i c i z i n g 
the developed world's misguided policies toward the periphery 
under the banner of a healthier environment. Although Brazil 
claimed an undeniable right to develop, even i f that might hurt 
ecology, when i t was confronted with a concrete example of i t s 
own "misguided" policies jeopardizing the Argentine right to 
develop by sharing resources, Brazil hid behind the supposedly 
sacred principles of national sovereignty. 
In short, the Brazilian stand on environmental issues in the 
e a r l y s e v e n t i e s was a l e g i t i m a t e product of the 
technobureaucratic-military alliance. Its policies were based, 
and w i l l be based at least for the next few years, on a tripod. 
The primacy of economic growth over conservation and the 
rational use of natural resources constitutes, perhaps, the 
oldest part of ecopolitical ideology in Brazil, dating back to 
colonial times. The two "modern" additions to the tripod have 
been, on the one hand, the consideration of environmental 
problems according to the precepts of sovereignty and national 
security, and on the other, the tight compartmentalization of 
environmental management through bureaucratic expertise. Each 
component represents the interests of one of the partners in the 
alliance that took over in 1964. Considering that the main 
features of this evolution obviously transcended situational 
characteristics of the regime, those attitudes w i l l most probably 
exert a great deal of influence on environmental management in 
Brazil for many years to come. 
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V. ECOLOGICAL DISORDER IN BRAZIL ( 3 ) : 
THE BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
As the formation of a society unfolds, the emergence of dominant 
interests and classes becomes more evident. The process of 
forging and bireaking down alliances reveals also distinctive 
features of the State. Hence, studying these processes of social 
formation and of State building makes more transparent the 
prevailing patterns of relationship between humans and nature in 
that particular society. Yet, a closer focus on how decisions are 
made may shed light on more general ecopolitical processes. 
1- If you can't find a deodorizer, create an aaencv 
It has become almost axiomatic to repeat Engels's assertion that 
people themselves make their history, only they do so within a 
determined environment that conditions i t , based upon relations 
that are already in place. 42/ Bearing Engels in mind, we turn 
to a l i t t l e known fact of Brazilian ecopolitical history. This is 
the simple signature attached to an obscure document of the 
National Security Council, the Exposição de Motivos No. 100/71. 
An E.M. i s a document that usually accompanies a decree, 
containing the justification for a particular policy. The 
signature on this particular E.M. is that of Brigadier General 
João Baptista Figueiredo, then secretary-general of the NSC. 
This E.M. would not require much attention i f i t were not 
for two facts. First, the bearer of that signature seven years 
later became president of Brazil. Furthermore, a l l of what can be 
considered the o f f i c i a l ideology of environmental management in 
Brazil was already contemplated in that otherwise bureaucratic 
label E.M. 100/71. This E.M. responded to another bureaucratic 
action, also otascurally t i t l e d , Aesp./AOI/DNU/266/602.60(04), of 
23 August 1971, 43/ which constituted the o f f i c i a l , Itamaraty 
position regarding environmental matters, and was used as the 
basis for the Brazilian participation at Stockholm. This document 
was subjected to the careful scrutiny of the NSC, and i t was 
endorsed by someone who, in the years immediately before becoming 
president, was to serve as head of the National Information 
Service, a powerful Brazilian organization that i s a mixture of 
the FBI and the CIA, an organization whose head occupied the most 
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important post in the policy-making hierarchy of the military 
regime. This scrutiny and endorsement laid the groundwork for the 
establishment of a specialized agency to deal with environmental 
matters. In October 1973, Decree No. 73.030 created this agency, 
the Secretaria Especial do Meio Ambiente (equivalent to the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency), under the coordination of the 
interior minister. The very situation, almost fortuitous, that 
allowed i t to come into being is revealing both of Brazilian 
ecopolitics and of bureaucratic politcs more generally. 
The opportunity came in the form of stench. Fortunately 
enough for environmentalists, the odors were causing pestilence 
in the home state of the chefe do gabinete c i v i l , the chief of 
staff for the president of Brazil. The operation of a wood-pulp 
industry near Porto Alegre, the capital of the southern state of 
Rio Grande do Sul, was causing severe inconvenience for the 
general population. Every time the wind blew the wrong way, a new 
wave of nausea, vomiting, and sickness affected an increasingly 
vocal population. After contact was made with the Interior 
Ministry, which was supposed to have a say in urban planning and 
zoning, this matter was brought to the attention of the Gabinete 
C i v i l through a decree that was tailor-made for the situation. 
Its backers were ready with the necessary Exposição de Motivos 
and everything else that the patrimonial order would c a l l for on 
such occasions. This decree provided for a specific agency to be 
charged with solving specific problems such as the one in 
question. Being a very popular figure in Rio Grande do Sul, where 
he had been president of one of the two major soccer teams, and 
being also an authority on legal matters. Professor João Leitão 
de Abreu, the chief of s t a f f , immediately seized the 
opportunity. With the enactment of Decree 73.030 by President 
Emilio Garrastazú Medici, Brazil gained a new agency. And the 
chief of staff got r i d of a smelly problem. 
This experience reveals more about Brazil than i t appears to 
do. The way in which an organization comes into being exerts a 
definite influence on the perceived missions of i t s members.44/ 
An agency that has resulted out of an emergency situation is 
l i k e l y to respond, in i t s day-to-day operations, in a spasmodic, 
emergency-like pattern. Another agency created to placate special 
interests i s unlikely to address issues that may jeopardize i t s 
original clientele. SEMA was created in response to an instance 
of environmental contamination, and this fact would later have a 
lasting effect both on i t s members' sense of purpose—the 
organizational "culture" of SEMA—and on i t s effectiveness in 
implementing ecopolicies as well. Ecopolitics in Third World 
countries deals more with managing the natural resource base than 
with abating pollution. Brazil was one of the leading speakers 
for this viewpoint in Stockholm, Yet, up to now the dominant 
environmental perception in Brazil relates to the pollution of 
air, water, and s o i l rather than to natural resources management. 
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A second element of SEMA's creation also reveals the 
technocratic bias i n s t i l l e d at the moment of i t s inception. First 
of a l l , the E.M. that accompanies the decree establishing SEMA 
j u s t i f i e s i t on the grounds that Brazil already had a multitude 
of agencies working on specific areas, citing eighteen agencies 
distributed among nine ministries. Despite that, i t proposes as a 
"solution" the creation of yet another organization. Worse, an 
agency that worked according to the same precepts of bureaucratic 
behavior could not possibly be expected to get other agencies to 
cooperate. Being a second-class secretariat of a ministry, i t 
could not have any p o l i t i c a l clout, even in the most s t r i c t 
bureaucratic sense, that would help formulate and implement a 
national environmental policy. Furthermore, the actual way in 
which SEMA was staffed points to the predominance of a particular 
professional perspective, that of the natural sciences broadly 
defined: chemistry, biology, pharmacology, and others. 
As a result, the government has been able to depoliticize 
environmental issues, reducing them to a question of techno-
bureaucratic expertise. This poses a set of most d i f f i c u l t 
questions for the ecopolitical perspectives of Brazil. An 
ecopolicy must, at one and the same time, offer the basis for 
questioning specific styles of development and be, i t s e l f , the 
res u l t of s o c i e t a l decisions about the future of the 
co l l e c t i v i t y . Unfortunately, most environmental agencies, as 
they have been conceived, have actually worked to hinder, i f not 
to foreclose, the process of ecopolitics in Brazil. 
2. Competing p o l i t i c a l forces and the context of ecopolicies 
Any discussion of environmental policies requires a p o l i t i c a l 
instead of a technical treatment. At stake in ecopolicies i s much 
more than the simple arrangement of public actions in one area. 
An environmental policy that goes beyond pollution control and 
abatement, important as these dimensions certainly are, w i l l 
often imply redefining or redirecting the process of development. 
The h o l i s t i c and, at the same time, the specific nature of 
ecological problems also underscores the p o l i t i c a l foundations of 
ecopolicies. Because we cannot deal with a l l problems at once, we 
are forced to choose particular areas or problems for concerted 
governmental efforts. However, by singling out any given area, we 
are bound to provoke jurisdictional disputes within and between 
bureaucratic and societal institutions. This in addition, of 
course, to the problems derived from an application of what 
Herbert Simon call s "bounded rationality"—the limited capacity 
of the human mind compared to the scope of the problems i t needs 
to address—to complex ecological relationships. 45/ Another 
d i s t i n c t i v e dimension of public actions concerning the 
environment (pollution control and management of resources) 
derives from the extreme d i f f i c u l t y of directly measuring their 
results for society as a whole. Likewise, these results are 
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hardly amenable to individualization. How can one measure the 
benefits of the conservation of natural resources for generations 
not yet born? What i s one person's share of an atmosphere free of 
pollutants, or improved water quality? 
These three notions, that ecopolicies question development 
processes, that they generate jurisdictional disputes, and that 
they are nonquantifiable and nonindividualizable, a l l lead to one 
crucial feature of the context in which environmental problems 
emerge. Within the cultural framework of modern c i v i l i z a t i o n , in 
which human beings are not part of but rather apart from nature, 
ecopolicies are clearly unsympathetic, bothersome. Environmental 
policies stand out from other public policies by being "the 
spoiler." Traditional policies such as those carried out in 
agriculture, in transportation or in industrial development, draw 
their legitimacy from "positive" objectives. They a l l "provide" 
something to society. Moreover, the implementation of these 
policies w i l l , sooner or later, be transformed into tangible 
benefits to e a s i l y i d e n t i f i a b l e individuals or groups. 
Conversely, environmental policies address the co l l e c t i v i t y as a 
whole, i n c l u d i n g unborn " c o l l e c t i v i t i e s . " Furthermore, 
ecopolicies are characteristically "negative" in comparison with 
other policies, always calling attention to what should not be 
done, often emphasizing the negative side effects of "positive" 
policies. On the other hand, some "negative" policies, such as 
f i s c a l and tributary policies, also "penalize" some groups while 
favoring others. But these policies claim their legitimacy from 
the coercive powers bestowed upon them by society. Nobody likes 
to pay taxes, but everyone agrees that governments need revenues 
to carry out programs. A l l expect to benefit from these programs. 
With environmiïntal policies the opposite takes place. Even 
though the survival of the species could exert a strong coercive 
influence, advocates of ecopolicies shy away from intimidation. 
We thus arrive at the core of the dilemmas faced by 
policymakers struggling to implement environmental policies 
today. On the one side, their stand must be adversarial, almost 
by definition. On the other, decision makers are compelled to 
exercise persuasion, convincement, and inducement in a continuous 
learning process. Not surprisingly, i t requires much more 
p o l i t i c a l w i l l to break the inertia of environmental policies 
than i t does in other areas of public action. Likewise, i t takes 
much less p o l i t i c a l clout on the other side to reach a situation 
of v i r t u a l stalemate, to immobilize environmentally oriented 
programs and act i v i t i e s . As a former high-ranking o f f i c i a l who 
played a decisive role in the creation of SEMA puts i t , to have 
an effective environmental policy one must create conflicts. In 
this context, the crucial question turns out to be whether 
conflict i s being well administered or not. 
We have seen indications that the intr i n s i c tensions of 
ecopolicies have not been well administered in Brazil. Quite the 
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contrary, the way in which Brazil i s administered only aggravates 
the conflicts, and i t postpones their resolution as well. The 
negotiation that allows any conflict to be addressed presupposes 
the existence of actors that share more or less equivalent 
control over p o l i t i c a l resources. Nothing could be further from 
this assumption than p o l i t i c s in the environmental arena of 
Brazil. On one side there is a strong group of business people, 
industrialists, and multinational corporations, a l l of whom 
benefit greatly from accelerated economic growth. On the other 
side i s a loosely related group of community-based organizations, 
conservacionists, experts, and persons directly affected either 
by pollution or by the depletion of natural resources. In the 
middle, in some sense over both groups, stands the bureaucracy. 
As Francis Rourke rightfully points out, bureaucrats are 
unable to rule alone, but their strategic role in policy-making 
means that "no one in modern po l i t i c s can rule without them" 
either. 46/ If this i s true in the North American context, i t is 
even more so in Brazil, where the technobureaucracy has been the 
leading force behind developmentalism in the postwar period. The 
"actors" involved in Brazilian ecopolitics have thus had unequal 
power, which renders the situation a "nonconflictive" one that 
does not appear to demand great administrative resources. State 
agents set the stage for mediation, but they unilaterally set the 
limits also of such negotiation. The stage i s one where 
environmental problems are tightly compartmentalized through 
bureaucratic expertise, and where citizens are unable to express 
t h e i r interests. The limits for negotiating environmental 
conflicts can be summarized as follows. National leaders do not 
acknowledge that the security of the nation depends upon an 
ecologically sound development strategy; instead, environmental 
c r i t e r i a are subsumed by national security interests defined 
m i l i t a r i l y . Furthermore, rapid economic growth have high priority 
over conservation. On top of that, the technobureaucracy and the 
corporate e l i t e share an ideological orientation toward the 
private allocation of natural resources regarding the Brazilian 
"commons." As can be readily inferred, this i s a no-win type of 
war, a conflict where only one side i s armed. 
The situation is not, of course, as bad as i t looks. 
Actually, i t i s much worse! One may argue that in a situation 
such as B r a z i l — a statist society embedded in a patrimonial 
order—most conflicts, as well as any negotiation, occur within 
the governing e l i t e rather than through independent p o l i t i c a l 
actors. That i s precisely the reason why the situation gets 
worse, or why conflicts are not administered at a l l . The sheer 
number of actors inside each segment of the bureaucracy 
effectively precludes interagency cooperation. The Secretariat 
for Modernization and Administrative Reform (SEMOR), an agency 
subordinated to the planning minister, once set out to determine 
how many organizations at only the federal level were involved in 
environmental matters. 47/ For pollution control, for example, i t 
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found sixteen agencies distributed among six ministries. However, 
the method used to arrive at such estimates was too restrictive. 
As a former deputy-secretary of SEMOR myself, I know that this 
number does not even approximate the real picture. A simple, more 
recent example underscores this. Given the concerns of the 
secretariat, as well as those of the National Program of 
Debureaucratization, regarding the duplication of functions in 
the federal government, a group of technicians decided to find 
out how many agencies dealt with something as simple as fishing 
a c t i v i t i e s . When they gave up counting, over sixty federal 
agencies had already been identified. 48/ 
3. The bureaucratic p o l i t i c s of environmental 
policy formation 
Unfortunately, given the characteristics of both the context of 
environmental problems and the actors involved in the formation 
of ecopolicy in Brazil, some of the widely accepted "principles" 
of bureaucratic behavior inhibit s t i l l further the emergence of 
coherent policies in this area. The f i r s t and most important of 
these postulates refers to the fact that "where you stand depends 
on where you s i t , " which is also called Miles' Law. 49/ It means 
that the position of a bureaucrat on any policy issue is 
determined by the culture of the agency that he or she 
represents. This culture, in turn, reflects the institutional 
history of the agency, as well as the ideology, values, symbols, 
professional leanings, and crystallized patterns of behavior of 
the group of bureaucrats who make up the organization. 
Illustrations of Miles' Law in Brazil are easily found. An 
example that the policy-vision of a bureaucrat i s limited by the 
"viewfinder" of his or her agency's camera, has been offered by a 
noted Brazilian economist who successively headed the Ministry of 
Finance and the Planning Secretariat. As finance minister, he was 
a staunch opponent of the Ferrovia do Aço, a costly railroad to 
carry the iron ore from Minas Gerais to the port of Rio de 
Janeiro. While he held that position the construction dragged on. 
Under a new administration this respected technician became 
minister of planning. In one of his f i r s t interviews he defended 
the urgent need to complete the proposed railroad, in light of 
the importance of expanding the industrial capacity of the 
country, increasing export earnings, and other arguments. 
Is this a typical example of how government operates in 
underdeveloped countries? Was this minister out of his mind? 
Nonsense. He was simply acting as a good bureaucrat. As finance 
minister he had to be concerned primarily with spending; he 
controlled the gates to the government's bank, or to the printing 
machine. Because the railroad would drain hundreds of millions of 
dollars from the treasury, he "had" to oppose i t . Later, as a 
planning minister he "saw" things differently. The landscape 
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viewed from this window is dominated by economic growth and 
development. The Ferrovia do Aço would generate export earnings 
at a time that Brazil was starting to feel the crunch of i t s 
external debt, so nothing was more "logical" than fighting for 
i t s completion. This brief vignette of bureaucracy at work in 
Brazil i s useful, because i t shows how "bureaucratic p o l i t i c s , " 
at the most elemental level, manifests i t s logic. Nothing here i s 
> exclusive to Brazilian society. There are several studies in the 
United States showing how bureaucrats shape policy to a greater 
extent than politicians and social sicentists like to believe 
that they do. 50/ Add a large amount of arbitrary, preposterous, 
and authoritarian behavior entailed by a patrimonial order and an 
oversized, overgrown State, and the picture becomes more 
complete. An agency with the institutional characteristics of 
SEMA, located f i r s t i n a ministry whose culture values 
public-works as the primary outcome of i t s policies, thus finds 
i t very hard to assume, or to convince others to assume, a pos-
ture of harmonizing the environment and development. 
The foregoing remarks about the actors involved in 
ecopolicy-making, the context in which their "acting" takes 
place, and the laws governing their performance, allow us to 
introduce two additional components of bureaucratic p o l i t i c s that 
are of paramount importance for environmental policies. The f i r s t 
i s that the more controversial a policy i s , the more li k e l y i t is 
that i t w i l l never be fu l l y formulated, and, i f i t i s , i t w i l l 
never be implemented. For the same reasons, decisions involving 
antagonistic interests that can be postponed w i l l be postponed 
i n d e f i n i t e l y . Unfortunately, environmental policies are by 
definition controversial, and they necessarily involve disparate, 
often opposing s o c i a l and economic interests. Brazilian 
policymakers are well aware of this fact. As a matter of fact, in 
light of the Brazilian case, a corollary to the two laws 
mentioned above could be suggested: the principle of the bottom 
line. Because the interests involved in ecopolicies are often 
conflictive, and because these policies are controversial anyway, 
one should strive "to compromise," to arrive at a minimum common 
denominator. The problem is that minimum in this case means "the 
less powerful." Consequently, the bottom line of ecopolicies in 
Brazil has been the familiar "development with low ecological 
cost," an euphemism created by the military regime to conceal the 
^ true meaning of the developmentalist ideology, i . e., development 
at any cost, social or environmental. 
B r a z i l i a n e l i t e s , particularly technocrats, have also 
learned the lessons of coping with innovations. Environmental 
problems have only recently been recognized. Ecopolicies thus 
represent an innovation, almost a revolutionary innovation, to 
the process of development planning. Faced with this new 
challenge, the Brazilian bureaucracy has adopted what Donald 
Schon ca l l s "dynamic conservatism." 51/ First, one accepts a 
discourse that incorporates the new issue, something that was 
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successfully demonstrated at Stockholm. Then follows the stage of 
"containment and isolation," when one l i t e r a l l y throws the 
discourse into a bureaucratic box in the governmental structure. 
Care should be taken, of course, not to provide adequate 
resources to this new agency. Just enough persons should be hired 
to give the impression that something major is being done—and to 
serve as scapegoats when things do not (as one knows that they 
w i l l not) get done. Just enough resources should be allocated, i t 
should not be forgotten, for studies, dozens of studies. 
Containment and isolation also have another important, j 
beneficial side effect for dynamic conservatism. These processes 
lead to compartmentalization. Now that environmental agencies are 
in place, busily t i l t i n g against their windmills, there comes the 
phase of "selective inattention." In other words, these agencies 
must be in a bus stop where the bus of power does not stop. Does 
the law require that these agencies participate in act i v i t i e s 
related to science and technology? Well, we may include a couple 
of representatives on an interagency committee, because, after 
a l l , we do not expect results to come out of committee work 
anyway. 52/ The law requires that large-scale infrastructure 
projects should undertake a thorough evaluation of their impact 
on the a v a i l a b i l i t y of natural resources and on the integrity of 
environment i n i t s area of influence? So we create an 
environmental unit as part of these projects and pretend not to 
perceive that we do not allow i t to interfere with planning or 
implementation of the projects. Finally, we may include a 
section on the environment in development plans, but we also 
forget to consider the targets and strategies outlined in this 
one section in the other, substantial parts of these plans. 
In short, one should promote the minimum change possible so 
as to guarantee that nothing w i l l actually change. This is 
dynamic conservatism. It i s dynamic because i t i s not the result 
of a carefully conceived scheme of overt resistance. This brand 
of bureaucratic conservatism develops out of the synergistic 
effect of part i c u l a r i s t i c interests. Because everyone is bound 
to be affected by ecopolicies, there is no need to connive in 
accord against taking them seriously. It i s just a question of 
letting the bureaucratic process run i t s coiirse. 
What has been said here can be, undoubtedly, generalized to i 
other agencies that deal with the development of the Amazon. We 
have seen this movie before, at different times, with different 
characters, and in different national settings. But there can be 
no doubt that the script is tailor-made for the patrimonial 
order. And the Brazilian bureaucracy has had plenty of candidates 
for the roles of starring actor, supporting actors and, as a 
matter of fact, for the entire cast. The only thing we w i l l not 
find in this movie is the traditional disclaimer. If any 
character, event or situation resembles environmental policies in 
Brazil, i t i s not merely a coincidence. 
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VI. EPILOGUE: POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, DIPLOMACY, 
BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS AND ECOLOGICAL DISORDER 
We are definitely in an age of scarcity. Modern technology has 
allowed a limited number of societies to experience unprecedented 
levels of abundance. Notwithstanding this, the "environmental 
c r i s i s " underscores the fact that we are running out of resources 
and out of places to store or dispose of our wastes. Absolute and 
relative scarcity—actual lack of resources and lack of access to 
resources—equally affect central and peripheral nations. But we 
are also l i v i n g in an era of scarcity of adequate institutions, 
and a scarcity of p o l i t i c a l w i l l as well. The vast majority of 
our social and p o l i t i c a l institutions were not designed for the 
basic dilemma of ecological scarcity; they can barely operate 
within i t s parameters, and they are i l l - s u i t e d to solve i t . 
!• Brazil in the 1990s: Hope or despair? 
The ecopolitical situation of Brazil i s undoubtedly depressing, 
but i t i s not necessarily hopeless. Perhaps the greater menace 
comes from the militarization of Brazilian society. We have noted 
how the military regime has enhanced the patrimonial heritage of 
Brazil, rendering i t a more authoritarian, bureaucratized and 
s t a t i s t society. The advent, however, of an industrial-military 
complex contributes to the perpetuation of these structural 
elements. Arms production, directly or indirectly, employs close 
to a million Brazilians, and military sales abroad provide a 
sizable proportion of export earnings. Brazil is already the 
leading arms producer and exporter in the Third World. 53/ 
This situation has a twofold meaning, and both meanings are 
equally disquieting. For one thing, i f the military has 
temporarily l e f t the foreground of Brazilian p o l i t i c s , i t s 
presence behind the scenes is acquiring strong roots in Brazilian 
society and in the economy. The consolidation of an industrial-
military complex may lead to a complete turnaround in the 
economic model of development. The highly sophisticated 
technology that i s required for arms production also necessitates 
that a major portion of the resources for s c i e n t i f i c and 
technological development be diverted to military programs. Hence 
the Brazilian economy may change i t s axis from the automobile to 
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the armored car, from the traditional industries of the ABC 
paulista [the auto-industrial c i t i e s of Santo André, São Bernardo 
do Campo and São Caetano do Sul] to the high-tech industries and 
laboratories surrounding São José dos Campos. 
Coupled with m i l i t a r i z a t i o n , the profoundly unequal 
distribution of personal and regional resources stands as the 
major obstacle to sound ecopolicies in Brazil. The defense of the 
quality of l i f e of a col l e c t i v i t y presupposes an equitable 
distribution of resources, as well as of the social and p o l i t i c a l 
power entailed by their possession. Few would have qualms about i 
this assertion. Also, in few nations would anyone find the 
contrasts to be more glaring than in Brazil. The wealthiest of 
Brazil are among the wealthiest in the world. But i t s poorest 
also number among the poorest in the world. Brazil has changed 
dramatically in the past three decades while at the same time i t s 
resources have become even more concentrated geographically and 
s o c i a l l y . Furthermore, Brazilian development has taken an 
increasing t o l l on the ecological endowment of the nation. 
Whatever the vantage point from which one approaches the 
situation in Brazil, the 80 million Brazilians, the 60 percent of 
the population that goes to sleep undernourished every night, or 
the 40 million who f a l l below the line of absolute poverty, 
constitute a clear indication of the perverse results of 
ecopolitics in Brazil so far. 
There are, then, various reasons for despair about the 
ecopolitical future of Brazil. At the level of actual tendencies, 
to begin with, ecological resources are being used up at an 
exponential rate. There are worsening environmental conditions 
both in the countryside and in the urban areas. Completing this 
picture i s the rate of growth of the Brazilian population, which, 
even i f i t continues to decline over the next decades, s t i l l 
represents the addition of vast numbers of human beings to be 
fed, sheltered, and educated. If we turn, however, to the main 
features of Brazilian p o l i t i c a l development, the future looks 
even more bleak. The "new" authoritarianism brought about by the 
technobureucratic-military a l l i a n c e has e l i c i t e d latent 
characteristics of the nation. The demobilization of society, and 
the fragmentation of issues and interests are but one side of 
reality . On the other side stands the internationalization of the 
economy, the statization of national resources, and thus the i 
exploi t a t i o n of the B r a z i l i a n "commons" according to a 
developmentalist ideology guided by private c r i t e r i a for the 
allocation of resources. Both aspects render i t extremely 
d i f f i c u l t for a less pernicious relationship to emerge between 
environment and development in Brazil. The former makes i t 
problematic for society to organize autonomously around 
environmental issues; the latter incorporates a new logic of 
development that i s antithetical to the sound management of 
natural resources. 
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Fortunately, the future of human societies i s hardly ever a 
simple projection of their past. In ecopolitics more than in any 
other area of human endeavor, there i s apt to apply the popular 
dictum that "where there i s l i f e , there i s hope." Underneath the 
asphyxiating reality of a militarized state one can perceive the 
signs of a different society struggling to be born. So far, the 
birth has been effectively aborted on several occasions, but 
every new attempt must be greeted with enthusiasm, including the 
New Republic of 1985. The New Republic may be young, but i t s 
foundations can be traced back to the student revolt of 1968, to 
the electoral defeats of the regime since 1970, to the limited 
guerrilla warfare of the early 1970s, as well as to the 
mobilization of organized labor in 1978. Being established does 
not necessarily mean that i t w i l l be able to survive and to open 
a new era of more equitable relationships among Brazilians, and 
hence between Brazilians and Brazilian nature as well, s t i l l , the 
ecopolitical pessimi£im of these pages may prove to be mistaken. 
Alternatively, the evolving character of the situation in Brazil 
can be pictured in the joke of the two Brazilians talking about 
the future of the country. One, the optimist, asked his friend i f 
i t was not a great feeling just to begin to see the light at the 
end of the tunnel, after twent-one years of military tutelage. 
The pessimist, who may prove in time to be a r e a l i s t , replied 
that even though not much had actually changed with the 
innauguration of the New Republic in March 1985, i t was indeed a 
great feeling. The only problem, he added, was that "I s t i l l see 
the bayonets, unblemished, on the other side of the tunnel." 
At any rate, the ecological argument must be, by definition, 
a p o l i t i c a l one. Before one looks for the technical arguments, 
for rational decisions, the right p o l i t i c a l alliance that must be 
found. In po l i t i c o , there i s no such thing as "rationality." Only 
university professors and a few zealots of the "common good" 
believe in the possibility of rational p o l i t i c a l decisions. 
Rationality, in p o l i t i c s , i s defined according to the interests 
that are contemplated in a decision. In Brazil the necessary 
" p o l i t i c a l w i l l " to formulate and implement ecopolicies i s s t i l l 
lacking. The right alliances have not yet developed. But a l l of 
the evidence i s now at hand through which they can be forged. 
Toward the end of the decade, for instance, some episodic 
manifestations of popular mobilization, not sufficiently broad or 
permanent to be considered a "movement," seemed to indicate that 
Brazilians were starting to fight back. 54/ Few have been able to 
score significant victories like the successful 1978 blockade 
against the construction of the new São Paulo international 
airport that was i n i t i a l l y planned for Caucaia do Alto, one of 
the few natural forests l e f t in the state. Most protests end up 
being run over by the technocratic-authoritarian machinery, as in 
Contagem in 1975, or in Sete Quedas seven years later. These 
failures should not be cause for despair, though. The struggle 
for a healthier environment i s more similar to guerrilla warfare 
than most of us would be willing to acknowledge. 
34 
2. Improving our ecopolitical understanding about 
ecological disorder In Brazil 
This study has not been designed to examine the environmental 
problems of Brazil or of the Amazon in and of themselves. 
Instead, i t has tried to suggest how well or how badly equipped 
to face the ecological re a l i t i e s of the country the p o l i t i c a l 
system of Brazil has actually been. On this basis, no claims can 
be made to identify a l l the gaps that the present research has 
not been able to f i l l , or to point out a l l the necessary steps in 
the construction of an ecopolitical knowledge for Brazil. The 
ensuing remarks are meant to be no more than research "clues." 
On the more general level of ecopolitical studies, perhaps 
the greatest challenge lying ahead Is one quite similar to the 
"tragedy of the commons." Ethologists try to understand animal 
behavior; anthropologists are equally devoted to uncovering the 
subtleties of human behavior. Biologists carefully study how 
bacteria organize to get their chemical job done; sociologists 
focus on how communities go about caring for and nurturing their 
members. While ecologista try to make sense of entire communities 
of l i v i n g organisms, and their relationships with their immediate 
surroundings, p o l i t i c a l scientists investigate the mechanisms 
through which human behavior Is set in motion to get the 
community's job done. When i t comes to environmental problems, 
however, ecologists and p o l i t i c a l scientists have behaved no 
differently than did their colleagues in the natural and social 
sciences. They have a l l considered, albeit without acknowledging 
i t , the environmental issue to be "someone else's." But as with 
many things in l i f e , what i s defined as "everybody's problem" 
turns out to be nobody's. And so the environment has been the 
commons of s c i e n t i f i c knowledge. We take from It what may be 
useful to our own particularistic interests in science, and throw 
into It our s c i e n t i f i c waste. What we cannot explain with the 
analytical tools of our disciplines goes back to the commons, 
becoming somebody else's problem. Entropy and the laws of ther-
modynamics may be useful to explain economic phenomena? So much 
the better, we say, see how economics i s relevant to modern 
concerns. What? I cannot apply economic c r i t e r i a to explain how 
the natural resources of the Amazon must be available not for 
this particular "market," at this particular point in time, but 
for a l l "markets" to come? I'm sorry, that i s somebody else's 
problem. Try ecology, try ethics, try philosophy, the farthest 
from my socially accepted area of ignorance the better. 
Notwithstanding the need f o r the development of 
multidisciplinary approaches and methodologies to study the 
transformation of complex ecological systems such as the Amazon, 
there i s also a second set of reasons to "make" this our problem, 
and they a l l derive from the fact that the challenges lying ahead 
of us depend upon the complex equation of scarcity, s t a b i l i t y , 
democracy, and authoritarianism. There i s an overriding need to 
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explore how scarcity and s t a b i l i t y operate to maintain or to 
improve the carrying capacity of ecosocial systems. In this 
respect, a clear majority of social scientists, myself excluded, 
firmly believe that the ecological r e a l i t i e s of the world w i l l 
bring about more authoritarianism. Garrett Hardin and William 
Ophuls, among others, suggest that the current rationality 
guiding the use of common resources, in the democratic societies 
of the world, could lead to authoritarian societal institutions, 
and that this might be the only way to enhance humankind's 
chances for surviving the environmental c r i s i s . 55/ I believe, 
however, that the real danger comes the other way around, and 
Brazil may unfortunately provide the best i l l u s t r a t i o n in years 
to come. It i s precisely the corporatist organization of this 
society, with the heavy burden of i t s patrimonial and 
authoritarian heritage, as well as i t s ina b i l i t y to conciliate 
the interests of each social sector, that may truly underscore 
the "tragedy" of the commons. At any rate, a clear minority at 
this point, while conceding that i t i s extremely d i f f i c u l t to 
build resiliency into the framework of democratic institutions, 
s t i l l cannot envisage another possible path. Democracy may not be 
the only "possible" way to solve the ecological puzzle. It may 
not even be the most likely, at the present time. But i t 
certainly i s the only one worth striving for. 
On the more concrete level of ecopolitical analysis, this 
study has described how environmental concerns evolved within the 
process of Brazilian p o l i t i c a l development. It has identified the 
major actors and processes involved in the ecopolitical arena of 
the country. It i s time now to put this somewhat static picture, 
as far as public policies are concerned, into motion. We should 
examine the bureaucratic p o l i t i c s of, say, the conservation of 
national forests, the expansion of agriculture or reforestation, 
and, at the same time, undertake an institutional analysis of the 
most important agencies responsible for these areas. There i s , of 
course, a need to focus on the role of the courts and of the 
legislature in a l l these aspects. 
A fourth important area deserving of attention i s public 
opinion. There i s a pressing need to undertake periodic 
assessments of "the state of the environment" in Brazil, in 
p o l i t i c a l as well as technical terms. Fi r s t of a l l , environmental 
quality or, ultimately, the quality of human l i f e i s primarily a 
social, collective goal. However, considering that any system of 
indicators tenda to favor quantitative, measurable facets of 
reality, a report on environmental quality i s bound to be heavily 
s t a t i s t i c a l . 56/ But i t should be e x p l i c i t l y acknowledged that 
such a system of evaluation tends to benefit the bpst organized 
groups in society. These groups have i n f i n i t e l y greater 
resources, both financially and informationally; they can 
understand the language and the implications of these reports 
more easily than the less privileged strata of society. In this 
sense, a system of periodic evaluations of environmental quality 
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must become an instrument of social control. It may constitute 
one of the most powerful mechanisms for a community to exercise 
direct control over the allocation of resources that are geared 
toward the satisfaction of social needs. 
Public opinion research i s thus a crucial i f complicated 
element of ecopolicies. If measures of environmental quality are 
to be improved to account better for social differentials, among 
other elements, this must be done through survey research. We do " 
not look at perceptions when we notice an improvement of 
indicators such as the total area of protected natural forests, 
physicians per thousand inhabitants, or carbon monoxide per 1 
vehicles in operation. There i s only one way to find out whether 
changes in these indicators alter people's perceptions of their 
quality of l i f e . We must ask them. As a matter of fact, survey 
research may represent for modern democracies what the public 
square represented for Athens: the vehicle through which to voice 
the preferences of each citizen. We have an urgent need to carry 
out surveys of the general population, tapping environmental 
dimensions such as the devastation of the Amazon, but also asking 
questions of the "most-important-problem" variety, so that the 
salience of environmental issues may be put in the correct 
perspective. Also needed are comparable surveys designed for 
specific subgroups, such as members of the e l i t e , experts on 
environmental matters, and the technicians and bureaucrats who 
work in environmental agencies. Finally, considering the 
importance of genfjral elections, the salience of environmental 
issues in electoral results must be studied as well. 
We should not close this section without a word on the role 
of comparative studies. This i s particularly relevant for the 
case of the Amazon. However, we must move beyond the comparative 
study of s p e c i f i c development projects. We must develop 
comparable knowledge about entire areas of policy action. We 
should also address issues of a higher level of abstraction. 
Comparative ecopolitical studies should identify, for example, 
when p o l i t i c a l parties matter in determining the outcome of 
ecopolicies, and in what context. They should investigate whether 
i t makes any difference i f a market allocation of resources 
predominates over state run economies. Ultimately, what we are 
striving to understand i s whether the emergence of environmental 
issues makes any difference in the ways that p o l i t i c a l systems 
operate. These types of questions cannot be addressed adequately ^ 
unless differences and similarities between national societies 
can be established on a regular basis. Even more so in the 
situation of the Amazon, where several nations share a commom 
pool of natural resources. From these studies w i l l come better 
and more accurate regional and global perspectives. From them too 
w i l l come the possibility of more adequate policies, f i r s t at the 
national level and then regionally and globally. 
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